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AGENCY SETTLEMENT REVIEWABILITY
Dustin Plotnick*
Administrative agency settlements have recently come under increased
judicial scrutiny. Agency actions are presumptively reviewable under the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which means they are generally
subject to, among other requirements, “arbitrary and capricious” review
under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) and Motor Vehicles Manufacturing Ass’n of the
United States v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. In contrast,
the U.S. Supreme Court held in Heckler v. Chaney that agency no-action
decisions are presumptively unreviewable because they are “committed to
agency discretion by law” under 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2). Are agency
settlements also presumptively unreviewable? In other words, are they
more like actions or no-action decisions?
The Supreme Court has twice analyzed agency settlement decisions but
has never reached the “committed to agency discretion by law” question.
While the D.C. Circuit has ruled that such settlements are presumptively
unreviewable, no other circuit has established binding precedent on the
issue, and the Ninth Circuit has reviewed agency settlements in several
discrete cases. This Note argues that, based on the criteria put forward in
Heckler v. Chaney, agency settlements are not presumptively unreviewable.
They are, in short, more like actions than no-action decisions.
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INTRODUCTION
Administrative agency settlements have recently come under increased
judicial scrutiny. In the summer of 2010, the Securities Exchange
Commission (SEC) entered a $535 million fine settlement consent
judgment against Goldman Sachs for providing incomplete information to
investors in the well-publicized “Abacus” deal.1 Goldman was alleged to
have made about $15 million in profits on the deal.2 In autumn 2011, the
SEC filed a similar consent judgment against Citigroup, except this time the
fine was only $95 million while the alleged illicit profits were considerably
higher, $160 million.3 Judge Jed Rakoff of the Southern District of New
York rejected the Citigroup consent judgment,4 and noted that the
discrepancy between the fines in the Goldman and Citigroup cases
“troubled” him.5
Both cases had gone before the court because they were consent
judgments, which, unlike regular agency settlements, are necessarily subject
to court approval.6 The SEC, however, could just as easily have skirted
consent judgment review by dropping an injunction against further
wrongdoing from the agreement.7 This would have achieved substantially
the same result,8 but without the scrutiny of consent judgment approval.
However, to what extent would this move have actually allowed the SEC
to escape judicial review? Agency actions are presumptively reviewable
under the Administrative Procedure Act9 (APA), which imposes a broad set
of restrictions on agencies, including that their actions must not be
“arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion.”10 The APA, however,
1. See Consent of Defendant Goldman, Sachs & Co., SEC v. Goldman, Sachs & Co.,
No. 10 Civ. 3229 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2010) (No. 25), available at http://www.sec.gov/
litigation/litreleases/2010/consent-pr2010-123.pdf; see also Louise Story & Gretchen
Morgenson, S.E.C. Accuses Goldman of Fraud in Housing Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2010,
at A1. The Abacus deal involved the sale of financial securities related to the housing
market.
2. See Consent of Defendant Goldman, Sachs & Co., supra note 1, at 1 (consenting to a
disgorgement of $15 million).
3. See SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
4. Id. at 335.
5. Id. at 334 n.7.
6. See infra note 78.
7. See John C. Coffee Jr., Collision Course: The SEC and Judge Rakoff, N.Y. L.J., Jan.
19, 2012, at 5, 7 (“The SEC could settle with the defendants for monetary damages and
withdraw its request for injunctive relief.”); see also Joel S. Jacobs, Compromising NEPA?
The Interplay Between Settlement Agreements and the National Environmental Policy Act,
19 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 113, 116–17 (1995) (“Settlement agreements are contracts that
resolve pending disputes between parties. Consent decrees are settlement agreements that
enlist the powers of the court, in particular the power to hold parties in contempt . . . .”).
8. See Coffee, supra note 7, at 6–7 (“[It is not] credible that the injunctive relief is that
important to the SEC (at least in the case of large corporate defendants) because the SEC
never seeks to enforce its injunctions through contempt . . . .”).
9. 5 U.S.C. § 500 (2006); see Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 139–41 (1967);
see also Ronald M. Levin, Understanding Unreviewability in Administrative Law, 74 MINN.
L. REV. 689, 702 (1990).
10. 5 U.S.C. § 706. See generally HARRY T. EDWARDS & LINDA A. ELLIOT, FEDERAL
COURTS STANDARDS OF REVIEW: APPELLATE COURT REVIEW OF DISTRICT COURT DECISIONS
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expressly exempts agency actions from judicial review if either the agency
statute precludes judicial review11 or the actions are “committed to agency
discretion by law” under 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2). The central question of this
Note is whether agency settlements fall within the § 701(a)(2) exemption.
The issue of settlement reviewability is especially important because
settlements now resolve the vast majority of agency enforcement actions.12
From a policy perspective, whether agency settlements fall under the
§ 701(a)(2) exception is a contentious issue. On one hand, agency
autonomy is beneficial because agencies have unique expertise that is useful
for setting agency priorities and estimating the likelihood of success when
engaging in enforcement actions.13 On the other hand, judicial review
under the APA was established to ward off arbitrariness and abuses of
discretion.14 Agency accountability to elected officials is limited, and may
be insufficient on its own at alleviating these concerns.15
The U.S. Supreme Court has addressed the § 701(a)(2) exemption on
several occasions, but not in the settlement context.16 In the landmark case
of Heckler v. Chaney, the Supreme Court held that agency decisions not to
initiate an enforcement action are presumptively unreviewable under
§ 701(a)(2).17 The D.C. Circuit extended Chaney to hold that settlements
are presumptively unreviewable,18 but no other circuit has established
binding precedent on the matter.19
AGENCY ACTIONS 167 (2007) (describing the standard for reviewing agency actions).
For an overview of the relevant factors for determining whether an agency action is
“arbitrary and capricious,” see infra Part I.B.
11. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1).
12. See Richard M. Cooper, The Need for Oversight of Agency Policies for Settling
Enforcement Actions, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 835, 835 (2007); see also Lars Noah,
Administrative Arm-Twisting in the Shadow of Congressional Delegations of Authority, 1997
WIS. L. REV. 873, 891.
13. See infra Part II.D.1.
14. See infra Part II.D.2.
15. See infra Part II.D.2.
16. The Court examined discrete agency settlement decisions in two cases, but in neither
case did it analyze the § 701(a)(2) question, either to adopt a general rule or to analyze the
particular application of the subsection in that case. See NLRB v. United Food &
Commercial Workers Union, 484 U.S. 112, 133 n.31 (1987) (“Because we find APA review
precluded by statute, we need not address petitioners’ alternative argument that 5 U.S.C.
§ 701(a)(2) (acts committed to agency discretion) also bars review.”); Cuyahoga Valley Ry.
Co. v. United Transp. Union, 474 U.S. 3, 5 n.1 (1985) (“[T]he cases do not pose the question
whether an agency’s decision, resting on jurisdictional concerns, not to take enforcement
action is presumptively immune from judicial review under the Administrative Procedure
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2).”).
17. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830–32 (1985) (holding unreviewable under
5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) the Food and Drug Administration’s denial of a petition by death row
inmates that the agency review lethal injection drugs for violation of the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetics Act). For a description of when the presumption may be rebutted, see infra note
124.
18. See, e.g., Ass’n of Irritated Residents v. EPA, 494 F.3d 1027, 1031 (D.C. Cir. 2007);
see also infra Part III.A.
19. In a nonprecedential opinion, the Third Circuit followed the D.C. Circuit, holding
that settlements are presumptively unreviewable. See Mahoney v. U.S. Consumer Prods.
Safety Comm’n, 146 F. App’x 587, 590 (3d Cir. 2005). The Ninth Circuit, on the other
AND
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Is a settlement more like a decision to act or not to act? This Note argues
that settlements should not be entitled to the presumption of unreviewability
because they do not meet the legal criteria put forward in Heckler v.
Chaney.20
This Note proceeds in four parts. Part I discusses the APA and agency
settlement generally. Part II explains the Supreme Court’s § 701(a)(2)
jurisprudence. Next, Part III examines the D.C. Circuit’s agency settlement
jurisprudence, which holds settlements presumptively unreviewable under
§ 701(a)(2). Finally, Part IV argues that settlements should not be entitled
to the presumption of unreviewability.
I. APA REVIEW AND AGENCY SETTLEMENT
The D.C. Circuit adopted its agency settlement rule on the basis of the
APA’s “committed to agency discretion by law” exception to judicial
review, 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2). But before diving into the meaning of
§ 701(a)(2) or the D.C. Circuit’s agency settlement jurisprudence, it is
necessary to examine the basics of APA review and provide a brief
overview of agency action, including agency settlement. Part I.A discusses
the statutory framework for agency review. Part I.B examines “arbitrary
and capricious” review, which is particularly important for analyzing the
reviewability question, in greater detail. Finally, Part I.C introduces the
topic of agency settlements.
A. Administrative Agencies and the APA
Under the APA, “agency” is defined as “each authority of the
Government of the United States,” excluding Congress, the courts,
governments of territories, and the military.21 Judge Harry Edwards and
Linda Elliot add that administrative agencies are organizations that are not
expressly designated by the U.S. Constitution but nonetheless wield
“authority of the Government of the United States.”22 The Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and SEC
are typical examples of administrative agencies.
Administrative agencies are generally created through, or authorized by,
congressional statute. For example, the SEC was created by the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.23 The EPA, on the other hand, was originally

hand, rejected § 701(a)(2) challenges to reviewability of individual settlement decisions in at
least two cases, but neither case established a general rule of reviewability. See United States
v. Carpenter, 526 F.3d 1237, 1241 (9th Cir. 2008); Portland Gen. Elec. Co. v. Bonneville
Power Admin., 501 F.3d 1009, 1013, 1031–32 (9th Cir. 2007).
20. 470 U.S. at 830–32.
21. 5 U.S.C. § 551 (2006).
22. See EDWARDS & ELLIOT, supra note 10, at 97 (quoting Franklin v. Massachusetts,
505 U.S. 788, 800 (1992)).
23. Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (“There is hereby established a Securities and
Exchange Commission . . . .”).
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formed by an executive order that reorganized some prior agencies,24 but,
after legality concerns, Congress supported the reorganization through
statute.25
These statutes are called “organic” statutes.26 Organic statutes declare
the “basic mission of an agency, its principal responsibilities, and its
authority to act.”27 They also sometimes specify judicial reviewing
standards of the agency actions they authorize.28
In addition to their organic statutes, agencies also have powers and
restrictions created by the APA.29 The APA effectively creates a set of
default rules that apply unless expressly countermanded by Congress.30 For
example, the APA divides all forms of agency actions into four categories:
formal adjudications, formal rulemakings, informal rulemakings, and an
implied catch-all category, informal adjudications.31 The APA imposes a
detailed set of procedural requirements on the various types of agency
actions.32 Failure to adhere to these procedural requirements is grounds for
challenging the action in an Article III court.33
Agency actions are presumptively subject to judicial review under the
APA,34 but can be exempt for two reasons. First, they can be unreviewable
under § 701(a)(1) of the APA if Congress has passed a statute precluding
judicial review.35 Second, agency actions can be unreviewable under
§ 701(a)(2) if they are “committed to agency discretion by law.”36 The
Supreme Court has ruled that agency no-action decisions are presumptively

24. The EPA was established by Reorganization Plan 3 of 1970, an executive order of
President Nixon. See 40 C.F.R. § 1.1 (2013).
25. Reorganization Act Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-614, 98 Stat. 3192.
26. See, e.g., Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who’s Afraid of the APA? What the
Patent System Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269, 279 (2007) (“Federal
statutes, known as organic statutes, create administrative agencies and empower them to take
a range of actions, usually including informal rulemaking and different types of
adjudication.”); Jonathan R. Siegel, Textualism and Contextualism in Administrative Law, 78
B.U. L. REV. 1023, 1033 (1998) (referring to administrative agency organic statutes).
27. See EDWARDS & ELLIOT, supra note 10, at 97.
28. See Benjamin & Rai, supra note 26, at 279.
29. 5 U.S.C. §§ 500–559 (2006).
30. See Benjamin & Rai, supra note 26, at 279–80.
31. See JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND REGULATION
584 (2010).
32. See id.
33. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(D).
34. See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 139–41 (1967); see also Levin, supra
note 9, at 702.
35. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1). For example, in Sackett v. EPA, homeowners challenged the
EPA’s issuance of an administrative compliance order under the Clean Water Act. Sackett v.
EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1367 (2012). The EPA argued that the Clean Water Act precludes
judicial review of compliance orders because, among other reasons, the Act gives the EPA a
choice of advancing by judicial proceeding or administrative action, implying the
administrative action is precluded from judicial review. Id. at 1373. The Court noted that it
presumes administrative agency actions are reviewable but then examines the express
language and intent of the statute for signs to the contrary. Id. at 1372–73. Ultimately, the
Court held the statute did not preclude judicial review. Id. at 1374.
36. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2).
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unreviewable under § 701(a)(2).37 This Note asks whether agency
settlements should also be entitled to a presumption of unreviewability
under § 701(a)(2).
B. Arbitrary and Capricious Review
It is important, at the outset, to explain some circumstances under which
an agency action may be set aside. In addition to the procedural
requirements identified above, the APA prohibits all agency actions that are
“arbitrary, capricious, [or an] abuse of discretion.”38 This clause is
generally held to refer to a single standard, called “arbitrary and capricious
review.”39
Arbitrary and capricious review includes an expansive set of restrictions.
Agencies must not
[rely] on factors which Congress has not intended [them] to consider,
entirely fail to consider an important aspect of the problem, offer[] an
explanation . . . that runs counter to the evidence before [them], or [offer
an explanation that] is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a
difference in view or the product of agency expertise.40

For example, in the landmark case of Motor Vehicles Manufacturing Ass’n
of the United States v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., the
Supreme Court invalidated an order by the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA) that rescinded an earlier requirement that cars be
manufactured with passive restraints (automatic seatbelts and air bags).41
The Court held that the order was arbitrary and capricious because the
agency didn’t adequately explain removing the seatbelt requirement and did
not examine air bag effectiveness at all.42
Under arbitrary and capricious review, agencies must adduce reasons for
reversing precedent during adjudications.43 For example, in Allentown
Mack Sales & Service, Inc. v. NLRB, the Supreme Court rejected the
NLRB’s decision to apply a “clear and convincing” evidentiary standard to
a particular employer requirement after the Board had previously
announced that a “preponderance of the evidence” standard would apply in
those cases, because “reasoned decisionmaking,” which is a requirement of
the arbitrary and capricious standard, “demands it.”44

37. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985).
38. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
39. See EDWARDS & ELLIOT, supra note 10, at 167.
40. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 43 (1983).
41. Id. at 34.
42. See EDWARDS & ELLIOT, supra note 10, at 169.
43. See id. at 168 (citing Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359,
374–77 (1998)); see also Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of
Arbitrariness Review, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 761 (2008) (“[A]gencies were required to . . .
justify departures from past practices . . . .”).
44. Allentown Mack, 522 U.S. at 376.
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Likewise, if an agency has established a general policy by rule or settled
course of adjudication that governs its discretion, the agency must supply a
reason when departing from the policy in order to clear arbitrary and
capricious review.45 This applies even if the agency originally had
“unfettered discretion.”46 In INS v. Yang, an immigrant who had gained
entry to the United States through a fraudulent scheme, argued that the INS
improperly denied him a deportation waiver by considering the fraud even
though the agency had a “settled policy” of disregarding such frauds.47 The
Court reasoned that if the INS had disregarded its settled policy, its waiver
denial could be void as arbitrary and capricious, but ultimately decided that
the INS had not disregarded its policy.48
One scholar, Professor Ronald Levin, has observed that some forms of
abuse of discretion challenges do not rely upon an assertion that the agency
“misunderstood its governing statute or any other source of legal
constraints.”49 He calls these “pure” abuse of discretion theories.50
Examples of “pure” abuse of discretion allegations include when agencies
misunderstand the facts, depart from precedents without good justification,
fail to reason in a “minimally plausible fashion,” and make “unconscionable
value judgment[s].”51 State Farm, because it involved a rejection for an
agency’s failure to present an adequate factual basis for its determination,
could be considered a “pure” abuse of discretion case.52 Rust v. Sullivan
presents a good contrary example.53 The Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) had restricted Title X funds from being used for abortion
counseling, referral, and advocacy as a method of family planning.54 Title
X provided that “[n]one of the funds appropriated under this subchapter
shall be used in programs where abortion is a method of family planning.”55
The restriction on counseling was a “sharp break” with prior interpretations
of the statute,56 and the Supreme Court analyzed the change in
interpretation for abuse of discretion, holding that “the Secretary amply
justified his change of interpretation with a ‘reasoned analysis.’”57
45. M.B. v. Quarantillo, 301 F.3d 109, 112–13 (3rd Cir. 2002) (“[A]lthough its
discretion may be unfettered at the outset, if an agency ‘announces and follows—by rule or
by settled course of adjudication—a general policy by which its exercise of discretion will be
governed, an irrational departure from that policy . . . could constitute action that must be
overturned as [arbitrary and capricious].’” (quoting INS v. Yang, 519 U.S. 26, 32 (1996))).
46. Id.
47. Yang, 519 U.S. at 30–31.
48. Id. at 32.
49. Levin, supra note 9, at 708.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 43 (1983).
53. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
54. See id. at 178–79. Title X of the Public Health Service Act provides federal funding
for family planning services. See id.
55. Id. at 178 (alterations in original) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 300a-6 (1988)).
56. Id. at 186.
57. Id. at 187 (quoting State Farm, 463 U.S. at 42); see also EDWARDS & ELLIOT, supra
note 10, at 179 (“The Court upheld the change both because the new regulations espoused a
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As explained in greater detail in Part II.A, the existence of “pure” abuse
of discretion theories complicates the analysis of the proper scope of the
§ 701(a)(2) exception because the exception is arguably based—at least in
part—on the existence of a valid basis for setting aside the agency action.58
C. Agency Settlement
This section gives an overview of agency settlements and then describes
two related concepts, consent decrees and plea bargains. As explained in
detail below, most of the recent controversies involved consent decrees.
Plea bargains, meanwhile, are relevant as a basis for comparison to agency
settlements.
1. Overview of Agency Settlements
The APA does not expressly contemplate the possibility that enforcement
proceedings might be settled, and scholars have identified this area as a
“‘blind spot’” within administrative law.59 The issue of settlements is
especially important because they now resolve the “vast majority of
enforcement actions by federal agencies against public companies and other
major institutions,”60 making the “blind spot” quite large.
The archetypal agency settlement, for purposes of this Note, occurs when
an agency arguably has authority to sanction a private party through an
adjudication but ultimately agrees not to in exchange for consideration from
the party. For example, in Mahoney v. United States Consumer Products
Safety Commission,61 the U.S. Consumer Products Safety Commission
(CPSC) issued an administrative complaint against a BB gun manufacturer,
and, while the adjudicatory proceeding was in discovery, the manufacturer
made a settlement offer to the CPSC, which the agency accepted.62
The issue of judicial review of settlements generally arises when an
aggrieved third party dislikes the settlement terms. In Mahoney, the parents
of a boy injured by a defective BB gun challenged the CPSC’s settlement
with the BB gun manufacturer.63 Likewise, in United States v. Carpenter,
an environmental group challenged a proposed settlement between the
United States and a group of local residents who were trespassing on

permissible interpretation under Chevron Step Two and because the agency’s decision to
change its position was supported by the reasoned decisionmaking required by State
Farm.”). “Reasoned decisionmaking” refers to an arbitrary and capricious review standard.
See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
58. See infra Part II.A.
59. Jim Rossi, Bargaining in the Shadow of Administrative Procedure: The Public
Interest in Rulemaking Settlement, 51 DUKE L.J. 1015, 1016 (2001) (quoting Elizabeth Fisher
& Patrick Schmidt, Seeing the “Blind Spots” in Administrative Law: Theory, Practice, and
Rulemaking Settlements in the United States, 37 COMMON L. WORLD REV. 272, 273 (2001))
(referring to rulemaking settlements, but relevant to settlements generally).
60. Cooper, supra note 12, at 835; see also Noah, supra note 12, at 891.
61. 146 F. App’x 587 (3d Cir. 2005).
62. Id. at 588.
63. Id. at 589.
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federal land to restore a roadway to a wilderness preserve.64 The proposed
settlement would have permitted the residents to continue traversing the
land, but the environmental group believed this activity would harm a
population of local trout, so it brought an action demanding participation in
the settlement negotiations.65
Third parties have standing to challenge agency actions, including
settlements, under section 702 of the APA, which states that “[a] person
suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or
aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is
entitled to judicial review thereof.”66
Although the Supreme Court has not definitively ruled on the matter,
agency settlements can be subject to third party challenges because they are
final actions.67 In support of this viewpoint, the Ninth Circuit noted that the
Supreme Court has held that an Attorney General no-action decision was
nonetheless an agency action for purposes of section 702.68
There are strong policy arguments both for and against the proliferation
of agency settlements. Settlements can impose large costs on private
parties that may have little bargaining power,69 stifle development of the
law,70 and restrict the discretion of an agency in the future.71 On the other
hand, agency settlements provide agencies with greater discretion to
manage finite resources,72 and, like all settlements, help parties by reducing
outcome uncertainty.73

64. United States v. Carpenter, 526 F.3d 1237, 1238–39 (9th Cir. 2008).
65. Id.
66. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006). Third parties must also surmount constitutional challenges to
standing. See, e.g., Salmon River Concerned Citizens v. Robertson, 32 F.3d 1346, 1353 (9th
Cir. 1994) (“The doctrine of standing encompasses both constitutional and statutory
considerations.”); Coeur d’Alene Lake v. Kiebert, 790 F. Supp. 998, 1004–05 (D. Idaho
1992) (“In the case at hand, the minimum standing requirements of Article III must be met,
as well as the particular standing requirements under the APA.”).
67. See, e.g., Carpenter, 526 F.3d at 1241; Ass’n of Irritated Residents v. EPA, 494 F.3d
1027, 1029–30 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Mahoney v. U.S. Consumer Prods. Safety Comm’n, 146 F.
App’x 587, 589 (3d Cir. 2005) (nonprecedential).
68. See Carpenter, 526 F.3d at 1241 (citing Morris v. Gressette, 432 U.S. 491, 500–01
(1977)).
69. See Cooper, supra note 12, at 843.
70. See id.
71. Memorandum from Randolph D. Moss, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of
Legal Counsel, to Raymond C. Fisher, Assoc. Attorney Gen. (June 15, 1999), available at
http://www.justice.gov/olc/consent_decrees2.htm (referring only to executive agency
settlements, but with concerns that apply to all agency settlements).
72. Jacobs, supra note 7, at 113.
73. Id. at 116.
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2. Consent Decrees
Settlements are different than “consent decrees,” another popular form of
resolving administrative agency disputes.74 A consent decree is “an
agreement between the parties to end a lawsuit on mutually acceptable
terms which the judge agrees to enforce as a judgment.”75 Consent decrees
differ from ordinary settlements because in an ordinary settlement once the
parties have resolved their dispute there is no further judicial involvement.
For consent decrees, in contrast, the court enters the settlement as a
decree.76 This has the practical effect that “[i]f either party fails to live up
to the agreement, the other party can obtain contempt sanctions without
having to file an independent lawsuit on the contract.”77
Consent decrees require court approval78 (which involves at least some
judicial review)79 but can be functionally identical to settlements. For
example, Professor John Coffee notes that the SEC has a practice of
including injunctions against further violation of the law when settling
enforcement actions—making these settlements consent decrees—but
argues these injunctions serve no practical purpose.80 Judicial review of
consent decrees is not necessarily rigorous, and “will not usually reach the
merits of the underlying dispute.”81 However, several district court
decisions have recently approached agency consent decrees with increased

74. Consent decrees are not necessarily between agencies and private parties; two
private parties can enter into a consent decree. See Donald C. Baur, Settlements in Particular
Programs—Factors Distinguishing Administrative from Judicial Settlements—The
Distinguishing Characteristics of Judicial Consent Decrees, in 1 LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION § 9:81 (Sheldon M. Novick et al. eds., 2013) (“Consent decrees are also used
frequently to settle enforcement actions brought through citizen suits directly against
polluters, without government intervention.”).
75. Larry Kramer, Consent Decrees and the Rights of Third Parties, 87 MICH. L. REV.
321, 325 (1988). But Professor Kramer notes that there is no consensus view on the precise
meaning of a consent decree. See id. at 324–25.
76. See id. at 325.
77. Id.
78. See, e.g., Williams v. Vukovich, 720 F.2d 909, 920 (6th Cir. 1983) (“A consent
decree is essentially a settlement judgment subject to continued judicial policing.”); United
States v. City of Miami, 664 F.2d 435, 441 (5th Cir. 1981) (“‘[T]he [consent] judgment is
not an inter partes contract . . . when [the court] has rendered a consent judgment it has
made an adjudication.’” (quoting 1B JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL
PRACTICE ¶ 0.409[5], at 1030 (2d ed. 1980))); see also 46 AM. JUR. 2D Judgments §§ 183,
200 (2006).
79. See Kramer, supra note 75, at 358 (“Presently, all courts hold a fairness hearing
before entering a consent decree. This is a hearing at which interested third parties and
amici may comment on the advantages or disadvantages of a settlement; after hearing their
objections, the court may refuse to enter the proposed decree unless the parties revise it to
take third-party concerns into account. The Supreme Court assumed without actually
holding that a fairness hearing was required in [Local No. 93, International Ass’n of
Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 528–29 (1986)].” (footnotes omitted)).
80. See Coffee, supra note 7, at 7 (“[It is not] credible that the injunctive relief is that
important to the SEC . . . because the SEC never seeks to enforce its injunctions through
contempt . . . .”).
81. Jacobs, supra note 7, at 117.
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skepticism.82 If agencies respond to the skepticism by removing demands
for injunction, settlement reviewability will become increasingly important
because these actions will not be subject to consent decree review.83
Perhaps because judicial review of consent decrees is well established,
courts rarely analyze whether they are unreviewable under § 701(a)(2).
There have, however, been several cases where courts analyzed
administrative agency consent decree reviewability under § 701(a)(2).
Because these cases bear on the general issue of settlement reviewability,
they are also discussed below.84
3. Plea Bargains
A plea bargain is a “negotiated agreement between a prosecutor and a
criminal defendant whereby the defendant pleads guilty to a lesser offense
or to one of multiple charges in exchange for some concession by the
prosecutor, [usually] a more lenient sentence or a dismissal of the other
charges.”85 Plea bargaining is regulated by the courts, albeit loosely.86 In
federal court, judges may reject plea agreements that include the dismissal
of any charges or that include a specific sentence. If the plea agreement
merely involves a sentencing recommendation, then the judge cannot reject
the guilty plea, but does get to make the sentencing determination.87 Thus,
judges in federal court exercise some review as to the end result of every
plea bargain.
Judicial review of plea bargaining exists in spite of separation of powers
concerns. According to Professor Erwin Chemerinsky, lower courts have
found that “there is a political question when there is a challenge to the
exercise of executive discretion,”88 and the courts avoid political questions
in order to avoid “judicial intrusion into the domain of the other branches
82. See FTC v. Circa Direct LLC, No. 11-2172, 2012 WL 2178705, at *1 (D.N.J. June
13, 2012). The parties in Circa Direct LLC addressed the court’s initial concerns, and the
order was later approved. FTC v. Circa Direct LLC, No. 11-2172, 2012 WL 3987610, at *1
(D.N.J. Sept. 11, 2012). For another example of court skepticism of agency consent decrees,
see SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., No. 11 Civ. 7387, 2011 WL 5903733, at *2–3
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2011).
83. See Noah, supra note 12, at 927 (“If courts began reviewing proposed consent
decrees more vigorously, however, the government might prefer reaching out-of-court
settlements with regulated entities, which would avoid judicial review altogether.”).
Professor Noah bases his remark that settlements are unreviewable on NLRB v. United Food
& Commercial Workers Union. See id. at 927 n.199 (citing NLRB v. United Food &
Commercial Workers Union, 484 U.S. 112, 133 (1987)). But, as observed in note 16, supra,
that case refers only to settlements that are explicitly defined in the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA). See United Food, 484 U.S. at 118–19. The Court held that those settlements
were explicitly exempt from review under the NLRA via APA section 701(a)(1) and
therefore did not reach the section 701(a)(2) question. See id. at 133 & n.31.
84. See infra Part III.A.
85. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1270 (9th ed. 2009).
86. See STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
CASES AND COMMENTARY 1030 (9th ed. 2007).
87. See id. at 1058.
88. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 150 (4th ed.
2011).
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[of government].”89 This includes prosecutorial discretion, a “core
power[]” of the executive branch.90 However, in spite of the separation of
powers, courts are nonetheless capable of reviewing plea bargains.91
Agency settlements are comparable to plea bargains in criminal law.92
While a detailed comparison between plea bargaining and agency
settlement is beyond the scope of this Note, a limited comparison is useful
because the Supreme Court has compared agency no-action decisions to
criminal prosecutorial discretion when analyzing agency action
reviewability.93
Unlike the well-established judicial reviewability of plea bargains,
reviewability of settlements is unclear. The critical question is whether the
APA’s “committed to agency discretion by law” exception, section
701(a)(2), also applies to settlements.
II. THE “COMMITTED TO AGENCY DISCRETION BY LAW” EXCEPTION,
5 U.S.C. § 701(A)(2)
Before assessing whether the § 701(a)(2) exception applies to agency
settlements, it is necessary to examine the exception in detail. The Supreme
Court has announced three different—perhaps competing—standards
interpreting the meaning of § 701(a)(2). This ambiguity has not been
resolved, and lower courts continue to apply all of the standards announced
by the Court. To analyze the settlement question this section describes each
of the standards in turn, introducing relevant scholarly arguments and
describing applications by the lower courts.
Part II.A discusses the Supreme Court’s first case to address the
subsection, Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,94 which
announced the “no law to apply” test. Part II.B discusses Heckler v.
Chaney,95 which introduced a four-factor analysis for examining whether
particular types of agency action fall under § 701(a)(2). Part II.C describes
the “common law” approach to § 701(a)(2), which was first put forward by
Justice Antonin Scalia in his dissent in Webster v. Doe,96 and arguably

89. Id. at 149.
90. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 457 (1996); see Andrew B. Loewenstein,
Note, Judicial Review and the Limits of Prosecutorial Discretion, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 351,
364 (2001) (“Traditionally, separation of powers has been understood to impose on the
courts deference to prosecutorial decisions.”).
91. See supra notes 86–87 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Miller, 722
F.2d 562, 565 (9th Cir. 1983) (describing how, even though “separation of powers requires
that the judiciary remain independent of executive affairs,” courts are nonetheless “free to
accept or reject individual charge bargains”).
92. See Noah, supra note 12, at 903 (“Plea bargaining also offers some interesting
parallels to administrative arm-twisting.”). Professor Noah considers agency settlements to
be a type of “administrative arm-twisting.” Id. at 875.
93. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831–32 (1985); see also infra Part III.B.
94. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
95. 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
96. 486 U.S. 592 (1988).
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adopted by the Court in Lincoln v. Vigil.97 Lastly, Part II.D examines some
scholarly perspectives on how § 701(a)(2) should be applied.
A. Overton Park’s “No Law To Apply”
This section describes the “no law to apply” test, which was originally
announced in Overton Park. Part II.A.1 describes the Court’s opinion in
Overton Park. Part II.A.2 describes two problems of the test: surplusage
and “pure” abuse of discretion.
1. Announcing “No Law To Apply”
In Overton Park, a citizens group alleged that the Secretary of
Transportation had failed his statutorily mandated duty to examine all
“feasible and prudent” alternatives before authorizing funds for a highway
through a public park.98 The Secretary had not made formal findings
inquiring into other alternative routes for the highway, and the citizens
group contended that he thereby violated the statute.99 The Supreme Court
observed that the Department of Transportation was an agency under the
APA, making the fund authorization an “action” subject to review.100 The
Court then considered, as a threshold question, whether the Secretary’s
decision to authorize funds for the highway was unreviewable under
§ 701(a)(2), and held it was not101 because it was a “very narrow exception”
applicable only when there was “no law to apply.”102 The Court found that
the feasible and prudent alternative requirement established the existence of
“law to apply,”103 making the action reviewable.
In Overton Park, the Court used legislative history to arrive at the “no
law to apply” standard.104 A Senate report had described the clause as
referring to instances where “statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in
a given case there is no law to apply.”105 The Court seized on the “no law
to apply” language and adopted that as the test.106
2. The Surplusage and “Pure” Abuse of Discretion Problems of
“No Law To Apply”
One commentator, Professor Levin, has vigorously attacked the “no law
to apply” test. Professor Levin argues that the test makes § 701(a)(2) mere
surplusage.107 According to Professor Levin, under the theory of the Senate
97. 508 U.S. 182 (1993).
98. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 405–06.
99. Id. at 408.
100. Id. at 410.
101. Id.
102. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting S. REP. NO. 79-752, at 26 (1945)).
103. Id.
104. Id.; see Levin, supra note 9, at 705 (“The Court drew its ‘no law to apply’ test from
the language of the Senate Judiciary Committee report on the APA.”).
105. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 410.
106. See id.
107. See Levin, supra note 9, at 705–06.
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report, which he calls the “futility theory,” “agency action is ‘committed to
agency discretion’ only when there are no grounds on which the action
could possibly be set aside.”108 He continues, “When this condition is met,
however, the agency action obviously would survive judicial review in any
event.”109 Therefore, according to Professor Levin, in every unreviewable
case, the agency would have won anyway, thus making the entire
subsection surplusage.110
Professor Levin also argues that the holding in Overton Park ignored the
possibility that agency actions can be reviewed under what he calls “pure”
abuse of discretion theories.111 In Overton Park, the Court held that
§ 701(a)(2) applies when “statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a
given case there is no law to apply.”112 This implies that statutes are the
only source of “law to apply.” However, according to Professor Levin,
reviewing courts may also invalidate action on “pure” abuse of discretion
theories, which “do not rest on an assertion that the agency misunderstood
its governing statute or any other source of legal constraints.”113 He argues
that courts are just as capable of reviewing agency actions for violation of
“pure” abuse of discretion theories as they are for statutory violations, and
therefore there is no reason why § 701(a)(2) should apply to one and not the
other.114

108. Id. at 705; see also id. at 705–07. Professor Levin notes that the “futility” theory is
not the only possible interpretation of Overton Park’s “no law to apply” test, but argues that
it is a plausible interpretation of that ruling, and that the Supreme Court clearly adopted the
theory in Heckler v. Chaney, its next § 701(a)(2) case. See id. at 707 n.85. For a discussion
of Heckler v. Chaney, including the language that supports the “futility theory” of “no law to
apply,” see infra Part II.B.
109. See Levin, supra note 9, at 705–06.
110. As Professor Levin notes, he is not the only scholar to argue that “no law to apply”
makes the reviewability inquiry redundant with the analysis of whether the action survives
on the merits. Professor Cass Sunstein has echoed the point exactly:
Once one has said that an action is unreviewable because there are no legal
constraints on the exercise of discretion with respect to the particular allegation,
one might as well say that, with respect to that allegation, there is no legal
violation. In this respect, the distinction between a conclusion that a decision is
not reviewable and a conclusion that a decision is lawful is easy to collapse. In
both cases, one is saying the same thing: that the governing statute does not
impose legal constraints on the action at issue.
See Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CHI. L.
REV. 653, 659 (1985). But unlike Professor Levin, Professor Sunstein does not appear to
view this redundancy as a defect. See id.
111. See Levin, supra note 9, at 707–08.
112. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971)
(emphasis added) (quoting S. REP. NO. 79-752, at 26 (1945)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
113. See Levin, supra note 9, at 707–08.
114. See id. at 708–09 (“If judicial review of the agency’s factual perceptions, logic, and
consistency is acceptable when the agency operates under significant statutory restrictions, it
should be no less acceptable when the agency is not doing so.”). Professor Levin’s
surplusage and “pure” abuse of discretion arguments are alternative problems of the Overton
Park holding: if § 701(a)(2) applies even when an action could be invalidated for “pure”
abuse of discretion, then it is not surplusage because it identifies a group of cases where
§ 701(a)(2) independently protects an agency action from invalidation.
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The circuit courts are split on whether an agency action is unreviewable
under § 701(a)(2) even when it could theoretically be invalidated under a
“pure” abuse of discretion theory. The Eleventh Circuit holds that, so long
as an agency’s discretion is not limited by any “statute, executive order,
regulation, or treaty,” there is “no law to apply.”115 The D.C. Circuit,
similarly, holds that there is “no law to apply” when “[an agency’s]
governing statute confers such broad discretion as to essentially rule out the
possibility of abuse.”116
The Third and Ninth Circuits, in contrast, will determine that there is
“law to apply” on a “pure” abuse of discretion theory.117 In Chehazeh v.
Attorney General of the United States, the Third Circuit held that an agency
decision was not entitled to § 701(a)(2) unreviewability because, the court
concluded, past adjudications had established “a general policy” as to this
form of decision, thereby making any subsequent decision reviewable for
abuse of discretion.118 Because the agency action could be reviewed for
abuse of discretion on “general policy” grounds, there was “a basis for
judicial review”119—in other words, law to apply.
In Pinnacle Armor v. United States, the Ninth Circuit adopted an even
more expansive view, holding that any abuse of discretion standard satisfies
“law to apply”:
Indeed, although 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) insulates from judicial review
agency discretion where there is no law to apply, the APA itself commits
final agency action to our review for “abuse of discretion.” Those
standards are adequate to allow a court to determine whether the [agency]
is doing what it is supposed to be doing: setting out standards and
determining whether law enforcement products should be certified under
those standards, whatever they may be.120

The existence of the “pure” abuse of discretion problem may explain why,
when analyzing § 701(a)(2) in the context of an enforcement action in
Heckler v. Chaney, the Court opted for a different approach.

115. Conservancy of Sw. Fla. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 677 F.3d 1073, 1082 (11th
Cir. 2012) (holding denial of a petition to designate a critical endangered species habitat
unreviewable).
116. Amador Cnty. v. Salazar, 640 F.3d 373, 380 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Drake v.
FAA, 291 F.3d 59, 70 (D.C. Cir. 2002)).
117. See Chehazeh v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 666 F.3d 118, 128–30 (3d Cir. 2012)
(holding a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals to reopen removal proceedings
reviewable because it could run counter to a general policy expressed in past adjudications);
Pinnacle Armor, Inc. v. United States, 648 F.3d 708, 720 (9th Cir. 2011).
118. Chehazeh, 666 F.3d at 128–29.
119. Id. at 129–30.
120. Pinnacle Armor, 648 F.3d at 720 (citations omitted) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)
(2006)).
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B. Heckler v. Chaney, Reaffirming “No Law To Apply,” but Also
Introducing an Independent Factor Analysis
This section examines Heckler v. Chaney,121 the Supreme Court’s next
§ 701(a)(2) case after Overton Park. As explained below, Chaney held that
agency no-action decisions are entitled to a presumption of unreviewability
under § 701(a)(2) and complicated the analysis of § 701(a)(2) by
introducing four factors that influenced its holding on no-action decisions
without clearly explaining how those factors related to “no law to apply.”
Part II.B.1 introduces the Court’s decision. Part II.B.2 describes lower
court non-settlement applications of the decision.
1. The Court’s Opinion
In Heckler v. Chaney, a group of death row inmates had petitioned the
FDA, alleging that lethal injection drugs violated portions of the Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act and requesting that the FDA take enforcement
actions to prevent the violations.122 The FDA refused the request, and the
inmates subsequently filed suit in federal court, requesting that the FDA be
required to take the requested enforcement actions.123
The Supreme Court held that the FDA’s decision not to take an
enforcement action was unreviewable under § 701(a)(2), and further, that
all no-action decisions are presumptively unreviewable under the
subsection.124
The Court put forward two distinct justifications for its rule. First, the
Court reiterated Overton Park’s “no law to apply” standard, stating that an
action is unreviewable when “the statute is drawn so that a court would
have no meaningful standard against which to judge the agency’s exercise
of discretion.”125 The statute provided no constraints on when to make a
no-action decision, so there was “no law to apply.”126 Then, without
clearly identifying the relationship to “no law to apply,” the Court identified
four factors that compelled it to hold an agency no-action decision
unreviewable under § 701(a)(2): (1) the decision involved a “complicated
balancing of a number of factors which are peculiarly within [the agency’s]
expertise,” such as resource allocation, likelihood of success, and fit with
the agency’s overall policies;127 (2) refusals to act “generally [do] not
exercise [an agency’s] coercive power over an individual’s liberty or

121. 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
122. Id. at 823.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 832–33. However, the unreviewability presumption “may be rebutted where
the substantive statute has provided guidelines for the agency to follow in exercising its
enforcement powers,” predicated refusal solely on belief it lacks jurisdiction, or adopted a
general policy that is “so extreme as to amount to an abdication of its statutory
responsibilities.” Id. at 833 & n.4.
125. Id. at 830. This language articulates what Professor Levin calls the “futility” theory
of “no law to apply.” See supra note 108.
126. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 830.
127. Id. at 831.
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property rights, and thus [do] not infringe upon areas that courts often are
called upon to protect”;128 (3) lack of “focus for judicial review”;129 and
(4) similarity between no-action decisions and prosecutorial enforcement
discretion, an area that had long been considered exempt from judicial
review.130
One of the challenges when analyzing § 701(a)(2) is that the section
suffers an inherent interpretation problem. As stated above, under the
“futility” theory of “no law to apply,” which the court appeared to adopt,
§ 701(a)(2) is mere surplusage.131 However, if the “futility” theory of “no
law to apply” is not used, a second, different interpretation problem arises.
As the Court observed in Chaney, while § 701(a)(2) states that any agency
action “committed to agency discretion by law” is exempt from review, the
APA also declares that “reviewing court[s] shall . . . hold unlawful and set
aside agency action . . . found to be . . . an abuse of discretion.”132 The
Court thus identified a potential conflict between the two uses of
“discretion.”133 How can a court review an agency decision for abuse of
discretion when it is not permitted to analyze decisions that are committed
to agency discretion? The Court concluded that “no law to apply” solves
the problem because if an action has no standards under which it can be set
aside, it cannot be reviewed for abuse of discretion, and, therefore, the two
clauses never fight against each other.134 The Court ignored the possibility
that this created the aforementioned surplusage issue.
Professor Levin argues that the factor analysis is incompatible with, and
actually undermines, Overton Park’s “no law to apply.”135 According to
Professor Levin, “no law to apply” could not have sustained the
unreviewability determination in Chaney because there were “judicially
manageable standards” by which to judge the decision.136 Professor Levin
argues that, for example, if “the FDA had declined to proceed against
execution drugs on the ground that they were not dangerous at all,” and “the
record contained strong contrary evidence,” a court could hold that the
128. Id. at 832.
129. See id. (“[W]hen an agency does act to enforce, that action itself provides a focus for
judicial review, inasmuch as the agency must have exercised its power in some manner.”).
130. Id.
131. See supra notes 108–10 and accompanying text.
132. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006) (emphasis added).
133. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 830.
134. Id.
135. See Levin, supra note 9, at 712–15 (“On the surface, Chaney appeared to be a strong
vindication of the Overton Park test of unreviewability; most commentators have read it that
way. When the Court’s reasoning is scrutinized, however, Chaney proves to be just the
opposite. The Court subtly undermined the ‘law to apply’ formalism, substituting a
decidedly functional approach.”). But cf. Sunstein, supra note 110 (identifying the four
factors as evidence that there was no law to apply).
136. See Levin, supra note 9, at 714 (“[O]ne can easily conceive of ways in which the
Commissioner could have abused his discretion in responding to the prisoners’ petition, even
if we assume that the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act did not limit the FDA’s enforcement
discretion.”). Professor Levin argues that Chaney adopted the “futility theory” of “no law to
apply” and that this theory “standing alone, could not have logically supported the Court’s
finding of unreviewability in Chaney.” Id. at 715.
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decision was an abuse of discretion because it rested “on unjustifiable
factual assumptions.”137 Thus, according to Professor Levin, the Court had
to look beyond “law to apply” to hold the FDA’s decision unreviewable,
and so instead based its decision on “functional” considerations—the factor
analysis.138
2. Applying the Four Factors
This section describes lower court analysis of each of the four Chaney
factors: “complicated balancing,” “focus for review,” “coercive power,”
and the analogy to prosecutorial discretion.
a. “Complicated Balancing” (i.e., “Resource Allocation”)
By far the most popularly employed and discussed of the four factors has
been the “complicated balancing” factor.139 Judge Frank Easterbrook
provided a typical justification for the resource allocation factor in the
context of an SEC no-action decision:
Doing nothing may be the most constructive use of the Commission’s
resources. Congress gives the SEC a budget, setting a cap on its
personnel. With limited numbers of staff-years, the Commission must
enforce several complex statutes.
To do this intelligently the
Commissioners must assign priorities.
Prosecuting the [potential
defendant] means less time for something else . . . .140

Nonetheless, this passage perhaps too broadly states the strength of the
factor. Courts commonly use the resource allocation factor in “situations
where agencies make large numbers of informal decisions about whether to
enforce against individual parties.”141 Such decisions would potentially
result in lots of new activity for the agency. Heckler v. Chaney is the
quintessential example for this concern. In Heckler, if the Court had ruled
that the no-action decision was reviewable, the FDA may have been
required to investigate, or at least adduce reasons why it was not
investigating, any substance that could arguably be under its control,
regardless of the substance’s safety or popularity.142 Thus, rather than
focusing on new drugs and unhealthy foods, the FDA could have

137. See id. at 714.
138. See id. at 717 (“Had the Court been prepared to adhere strictly to the Overton Park
‘law to apply’ test, such policy considerations would have been irrelevant, and the case
would have been over almost immediately.”).
139. See, e.g., Eric Biber, Two Sides of the Same Coin: Judicial Review of Administrative
Agency Action and Inaction, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 461, 486 (2008). This Note also refers to
this factor as the “resource allocation” factor, although the notion is more expansive than
resource allocation, because it also includes agencies’ general policy goals.
140. Bd. of Trade v. SEC, 883 F.2d 525, 531 (7th Cir. 1989).
141. Biber, supra note 139, at 489; see, e.g., Block v. SEC, 50 F.3d 1078, 1081 (D.C. Cir.
1995) (holding unreviewable the SEC’s rejection of a petition to hold a hearing to determine
potential liability of directors of a corporation); Bd. of Trade, 883 F.2d at 531 (holding
unreviewable an SEC no-action order).
142. See supra notes 122–23, 127 and accompanying text.

1386

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

potentially been inundated with frivolous demands to review obviously
noncontroversial products or unreasonably close variations on already
approved products.
However, resource allocation has also been applied where granting
reviewability would not create new agency action but merely increase the
cost of an existing agency action. For example, in Ngure v. Ashcroft, the
Eighth Circuit held unreviewable a policy of the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA) to use a single immigration judge, rather than a three-judge
panel, in certain immigration hearings.143 The BIA had adopted the
procedural shortcut because of a mounting caseload.144 The court ruled that
BIA’s decision to switch to one judge was unreviewable, relying heavily on
the resource allocation consideration.145 Here, had the court declared the
decision reviewable, the result may have been that each adjudication would
have been more costly—by requiring three times the number of judges—
but would not have forced the agency to take on new agency actions.
However, on this particular regulation, the Eighth Circuit is in the minority;
all the other circuit courts that have examined this BIA policy have found it
reviewable, which lends added support for the “new action” theory.146
On the other side, the D.C. Circuit has rejected resource allocation as a
defense of unreviewability when it found that the agency’s decision was not
within its exclusive expertise. In Dickson v. Secretary of Defense, the court
held reviewable servicemen’s petitions to be able to apply for upgrades on
their discharge classifications because the Army Board for Correction of
Military Records must make such determinations “in the interest of
justice.”147 The court reasoned that “we have been shown no sufficient
reason why the determination, on a case-by-case basis, of what is ‘in the
interest of justice’ lies within the exclusive expertise of the Board.”148
b. Focus for Review
Lower courts have held agency decisions reviewable because there is a
“focus for review” when the agency has been forced to examine its
decision. For example, agency denials of rulemakings have focus for
review because the APA requires the agency to give a brief reason for its
denial.149 Likewise, in Dina v. Attorney General of the United States,
Judge James Oakes argued that when the organic statute requires the agency
143. Ngure v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 975, 983 (8th Cir. 2004).
144. Id. at 980.
145. Id. at 983. The resource concern was quite large in this case. Id. “[O]ver 28,000
appeals and motions are filed” with the BIA annually. Id.
146. Smriko v. Ashcroft, 387 F.3d 279, 294 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Chen v. Ashcroft, 378
F.3d 1081, 1086–87 (9th Cir. 2004)); Batalova v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1246, 1252–54 (10th
Cir. 2004); Denko v. INS, 351 F.3d 717, 731–32 (6th Cir. 2003); Haoud v. Ashcroft, 350
F.3d 201, 206 (1st Cir. 2003)).
147. Dickson v. Sec’y of Def., 68 F.3d 1396, 1403 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
148. Id.
149. See Am. Horse Prot. Ass’n v. Lyng, 812 F.2d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Farmworker
Justice Fund, Inc. v. Brock, 811 F.2d 613, 636 (D.C. Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 817
F.2d 890 (1987).
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to examine its decision, there is focus for review.150 Statutory or regulatory
requirements, however, are not the only way in which an agency might be
forced to contemplate a decision.
When circumstances force an agency to examine a decision, there is also
a focus for review, even if the agency was not compelled by statute to
examine the precise decision before the court.
For example, in
Transportation Intelligence, Inc. v. FCC, the FCC had granted certification
of a manufacturer’s radio system, and a rival manufacturer then petitioned
for revocation of the certification.151 The FCC denied that request, and the
rival manufacturer challenged the denial.152 Because the FCC had granted
certification in the first instance, and therefore had been required to
consider the certificate’s validity, the subsequent denial of the revocation
petition had a focus for review.153
Likewise, in Whitaker v. Clementon Housing Authority, Clementon
Housing Authority had ceased providing a low-income tenant with funds
necessary to pay rent on her apartment, allegedly in violation of federal
regulations.154 The tenant petitioned the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) to take action against Clementon Housing
Authority.155 HUD refused. The court held that HUD’s refusal had focus
for review because an “affirmative agency action ha[d] created the situation
from which plaintiff now [sought] relief through agency enforcement
action.”156
Focus for judicial review is to some extent intertwined with the third
Chaney factor, coercive power, because when agencies exercise coercive
power, they create a focus for review.157 It is possible, however, to have
focus for review without coercive power, for instance, when denying a
rulemaking.158

150. Dina v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 793 F.2d 473, 477 (2d Cir. 1986) (Oakes, J.,
concurring) (arguing that the Attorney General’s denial of an application for waiver of an
immigration requirement was reviewable because the relevant statute required a staff
member of the agency to assess the waiver and submit a recommendation to the Attorney
General). The majority in Dina, however, held the Attorney General’s action unreviewable
in part because the Attorney General, in conjunction with the U.S. Information Agency
(USIA), had reviewed all the factors it was required to review. Cf. id. at 476–77 (per curiam)
(“[W]hile regulations govern the submission to the [USIA], none offers adequate guidance to
make review for abuse of discretion possible where the USIA has in fact considered the
required factors on the required record.” (emphasis added)).
151. Transp. Intelligence, Inc. v. FCC, 336 F.3d 1058, 1060–62 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1063 (quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985)).
154. 788 F. Supp. 226, 227 (D.N.J. 1992).
155. Id. at 227–28.
156. Id. at 232.
157. See Eric Biber, The Importance of Resource Allocation in Administrative Law, 60
ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 36–37 n.119 (2008) (citing Transp. Intelligence, 336 F.3d at 1063); Int’l
Union, United Mine Workers v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 823 F.2d 608, 616 n.5 (D.C.
Cir. 1987)).
158. See Conservancy of Sw. Fla. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 677 F.3d 1073, 1084
(11th Cir. 2012).
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c. Coercive Force
Agency actions must have a “direct influence” on a person or entity to
have coercive force. For example, the D.C. Circuit in Robbins v. Reagan
held that agency decisions that amount to “rescissions of commitments” are
reviewable because they “exert much more direct influence on the
individuals or entities to whom the repudiated commitments were made”
than no-action decisions.159 Likewise, courts hold that decisions made in
conjunction with deportation actions have coercive force because the
affirmative decision to deport the immigrant creates a situation from which
he or she seeks relief—a direct influence.160
The “direct influence” definition is consistent with Chaney. The denial
of the prisoner’s petition resulted only in an indirect influence, because it
was only through allowing the drugs to be used that the prisoners
themselves were influenced by the agency action.161 Likewise an agency
decision denying a rulemaking does not have coercive force because it does
not directly influence anyone,162 but only indirectly influences through later
enforcement actions.
d. Prosecutorial Discretion
Courts have referred to Chaney’s prosecutorial discretion factor when
alluding to other areas of law in which “courts traditionally have been
reluctant to intervene.”163 This “traditional” theory is discussed in detail
below because it is also a general theory on the scope of § 701(a)(2).
Prosecutorial discretion is also used to support164 or refute165 analogies to a
no-action decision.

159. Robbins v. Reagan, 780 F.2d 37, 47 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (emphasis added) (holding
reviewable a decision by HHS to close a homeless shelter).
160. See Carrillo v. Mohrman, 832 F. Supp. 1412, 1419 (D. Idaho 1989); Gurbisz v. INS,
675 F. Supp 436, 444 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (holding reviewable a decision by the INS to deny
extended voluntary departure status to an alien resident).
161. See supra text accompanying notes 121–23.
162. See Conservancy of Sw. Fla., 677 F.3d at 1084.
163. See N.D. ex rel. Bd. of Univ. & Sch. Lands v. Yeutter, 914 F.2d 1031, 1038 (8th Cir.
1990) (Larson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (identifying prosecutorial
discretion and national security); Shearson v. Holder, 865 F. Supp. 2d 850, 866 (N.D. Ohio,
2011) (relating prosecutorial discretion and national security).
164. See Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Dole, 828 F.2d 799, 819 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Bork, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that an NHTSA decision to deny a petition to reopen an enforcement
investigation should be unreviewable because it was sufficiently similar to a prosecutor’s
discretion).
165. See Robbins v. Reagan, 780 F.2d 37, 47 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (holding an HHS decision
to close a homeless shelter was not sufficiently similar to prosecutor’s discretion to
constitute a no-action decision); Alliance to Save Mattaponi v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs,
515 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2007) (holding that an EPA decision not to review a U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers permit issuance was reviewable because it was not sufficiently similar to
prosecutor’s discretion to constitute a no-action decision).
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C. The “Common Law” of Judicial Review and Lincoln v. Vigil’s
“Traditionally Committed to Agency Discretion”
Early on after Chaney, it appeared that “no law to apply” would remain
the dominant test for the § 701(a)(2) exception. In Interstate Commerce
Commission v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, the Supreme Court
held that an agency refusal to reconsider a prior decision for material error
was unreviewable because of “the impossibility of devising an adequate
standard of review for such agency action,”166 echoing Chaney’s “no
meaningful standard” language.167 The Brotherhood of Locomotive
Engineers Court did not address the Chaney factors—for instance, the
potentially large cost of forcing the agency to reconsider every decision
after it has already been made.
The Court next addressed 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) in Webster v. Doe, which
also reaffirmed the primacy of “no law to apply.”168 In that case, an
employee of the CIA alleged that he was wrongfully terminated for being
homosexual, and challenged the termination as both a violation of the APA
and of constitutional liberties. The Court held that the APA challenge
failed; the CIA Director’s decision was unreviewable because the organic
statute gave the CIA Director the power to terminate an employee whenever
“necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States.”169 The Court
echoed Overton Park’s “no law to apply” standard, noting that there was
“no basis on which a reviewing court could properly assess an Agency
termination decision. The language of [the organic statute] thus strongly
suggests that its implementation was ‘committed to agency discretion by
law.’”170 The Court did not employ Chaney’s four-factor analysis, which is
very surprising, given that employment decisions directly impact an
agency’s ability to manage its resources.
Tellingly, Justice Scalia wrote a dissent that agreed with the Court’s APA
holding but disagreed with its reasoning.171 He argued that “no law to
apply” is not the exclusive test for 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2)172 and that the
Court gave short shrift to Chaney by ignoring that case’s discussion of
“general unsuitability” to judicial review.173 Justice Scalia then argued that
§ 701(a)(2) refers to decisions that had traditionally been exempt from

166. Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 482 U.S. 270, 282
(1987).
167. “No meaningful standard” is a “no law to apply” consideration. See supra note 108.
168. Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988).
169. Id. at 600. The Court ultimately held the employee’s constitutional allegations were
reviewable. Id. at 605.
170. Id. at 600 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1982)).
171. Justice Scalia dissented to the constitutional holding. Id. at 606 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
172. Id. at 607–08 (“Perhaps Overton Park discussed only the ‘no law to apply’ factor
because that was the only basis for nonreviewability that was even arguably applicable. It
surely could not have believed that factor to be exclusive, for that would contradict the very
legislative history, both cited and quoted in the opinion, from which it had been
derived . . . .”).
173. Id. at 607 (quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985)).
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review in a body of jurisprudence he called the “common law” of judicial
review,174 which includes various principles including the “political
question” doctrine, sovereign immunity, official immunity, prudential
limitations upon the courts’ equitable powers, and “what can be described
no more precisely than a traditional respect for the functions of the other
branches.”175
Justice Scalia argued that this view effectively distinguishes between the
otherwise inconsistent uses of “discretion” in the APA176 because this
reading of § 701(a)(2) identifies categories of agency decisions that are
beyond review, thus preserving the possibility of abuse of discretion “when
agency action is appropriately in the courts.”177
The Webster Court’s decision to narrowly read the § 701(a)(2) exception,
in spite of Justice Scalia’s forceful dissent, could be read as an affirmation
of “no law to apply” over the Chaney factors. But in the next case to
address the issue, Lincoln v. Vigil,178 the Supreme Court again changed
direction, appearing to adopt Justice Scalia’s approach.
In Lincoln v. Vigil, the Court held that an agency decision to reallocate a
lump-sum appropriation from a localized health program to a different
national health program was unreviewable.179 The Court’s principle
justification was that allocation of lump-sum appropriations is an area
“traditionally . . . regarded as ‘committed to agency discretion.’”180 The
Court identified both Chaney and Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers as
cases identifying areas “traditionally left to agency discretion.”181
The Court held that the lump-sum appropriation allocations are
traditionally discretionary; according to the Court, it is “a fundamental
principle of appropriations law” that lump-sum appropriations without
statutory restrictions are disposable at the agency’s discretion.182 The Court
further noted that case law clearly established that “‘a lump-sum
appropriation leaves it to the recipient agency (as a matter of law, at least)
to distribute the funds among some or all of the permissible objects as it
sees fit.’”183
The Court further reasoned that these appropriations were traditionally
discretionary for the same reason as no-action decisions: they require the

174. Id. at 608–09.
175. Id.
176. See supra note 133 and accompanying text (identifying the conflicting uses of
“discretion”).
177. Webster, 486 U.S. at 609–10.
178. 508 U.S 182 (1993).
179. Id. at 184.
180. Id. at 191–92 (emphasis added) (“Over the years, we have read § 701(a)(2) to
preclude judicial review of certain categories of administrative decisions that courts
traditionally have regarded as ‘committed to agency discretion.’” (quoting Franklin v.
Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 817 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring) (emphasis added)).
181. Id.
182. Id. at 192.
183. Id. (quoting Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of
Am. v. Donovan, 746 F.2d 855, 861 (1984)).
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same sort of balancing decision on agency goals and resources as a noaction decision.184
D. Scholarly Viewpoints on the Application of § 701(a)(2)
Scholars disagree on the proper test for § 701(a)(2). Professor Eric Biber
argues that a balancing test based upon resource allocation should be the
sole test of “committed to agency discretion by law.”185 Professor Biber,
however, also argues that the resource allocation concern is much weaker
when, as in a settlement, an agency has begun and subsequently aborted an
action.186 Professor Lisa Schultz Bressman, meanwhile, argues that Chaney
in general and resource allocation in particular fail to capture the APA’s
goal of preventing arbitrary decisionmaking.187
1. Professor Biber’s View: Resource Allocation Is the Principal
Reviewability Concern
According to Professor Biber, Chaney’s action/inaction distinction is
ineffectual188 and the other Chaney factors cannot persuasively account for
Professor Biber notes that the APA contains two
its result.189
complementary subsections, 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) and (2), which are meant to
refer to inaction and action respectively. Section 706(1) grants the courts
authority to “compel action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.”
Professor Biber argues that courts apply § 706(2), the “action” subsection,
to issues that are properly within § 706(1), thereby negating the distinction
between action and inaction. For example, he cites a case where the First
Circuit “‘set aside’ an agency’s pattern and practice of failing to properly
enforce the law because it was arbitrary and capricious”—a standard
rightly applied only under § 706(2).190
According to Professor Biber, of the four Chaney factors—“resource
allocation, prosecutorial discretion, ease of judicial review, and the proper
role of the courts in protecting individual liberty”191—only resource
allocation can adequately justify the ruling in Chaney.192
Professor Biber argues the analogy to prosecutorial discretion is not a
persuasive rationale when considered independently of resource allocation
184. Id. at 193.
185. Biber, supra note 157, at 9.
186. Id. at 29.
187. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency Inaction: An Arbitrariness
Approach, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1657 (2004).
188. Biber, supra note 157, at 4.
189. Biber, supra note 139, at 486.
190. Id. at 475 (emphasis added) (citing NAACP v. Sec’y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 817
F.2d 149, 160 (1st Cir. 1987)).
191. Id. at 486. Professor Biber does not explicitly examine “no law to apply.” The
language Professor Biber uses when referring to the four factors is slightly different than the
language this Note uses. When referring to “ease of judicial review” and “protecting
individual liberties,” Professor Biber is referring to this Note’s “focus of judicial review” and
“coercive force,” respectively.
192. Id.
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because, he contends, prosecutorial discretion is itself generally defended
According to Professor Biber,
on resource allocation grounds.193
justifications for prosecutorial discretion “boil[] down to deference to how
prosecutors should allocate their scarce resources among varying
objectives.”194 Professor Biber acknowledges that prosecutorial discretion
is often defended by referring to separation of powers concerns,195 but
argues that the Supreme Court often references resource allocation when
discussing the “functional grounds for those separation of powers
concerns.”196
Professor Biber argues that the “focus for judicial review” factor is
unpersuasive because courts generally interpret it as a test of whether the
agency has created a paper record,197 but “rarely, if ever” invalidate action
because the inverse is true.198 In support, he cites Overton Park, where, in
spite of the lack of paper record, the Court still held the agency’s decision
reviewable.199
Professor Biber argues that the final factor, coercive effect, suffers two
problems. First, it would require courts to analyze the significance of the
aggrieved party’s interest, which is difficult.200 Second, it relies upon “an
artificial distinction between whether a private party had a ‘right’ that the
government took away . . . and whether the person had a ‘privilege’ that the
government has simply refused to grant”—agency decisions not to grant a
privilege are unreviewable, whereas decisions to take away a right are
reviewable.201
Professor Biber argues that, because of the problems with the other
Chaney factors, courts should focus on resource allocation. He contends
that judicial review should not interfere in decisions involving resource
allocation because such action could potentially cripple agencies by forcing
them to make costly examinations of an enormous number of complaints.202
For example, Biber identifies a pre-Chaney D.C. Circuit case, Medical
Committee for Human Rights v. SEC, where the court observed that if SEC
“no-action” letters were subject to judicial review, the SEC would
effectively be barred from making such letters because the cost of litigating
the no-action letter dispute would be greater than simply formalizing the
193. Id. (“Indeed, the justification that courts and legal scholars use for prosecutorial
discretion generally boils down to deference to how prosecutors should allocate their scarce
resources among varying objectives, such as maximizing the probability of winning cases,
producing deterrence of future violations, and responding to public pressures and political
priorities for prosecutions.”).
194. Id.
195. Biber, supra note 157, at 19 (citing United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464
(1996)).
196. Id. (citing Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464; Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386,
396 (1987)).
197. Biber, supra note 139, at 486 & n.94.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 487.
200. See id.
201. Id. at 487–88.
202. See Biber, supra note 157, at 37–38.
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decision.203 Meanwhile, the cost of formalizing every “no-action” letter
would cripple the agency.204 Professor Biber argues that the Chaney Court
“obliquely” recognized this issue when announcing the “focus for judicial
review” factor, because holding no-action decisions reviewable might force
agencies to create paper records that the courts could review, thus
drastically increasing the cost for an enormous number of minute
decisions.205
Professor Biber, however, also argues that resource allocation concerns
are weaker when, as in a settlement, an agency has begun and subsequently
aborted an action.206 According to Biber, “the harm of requiring the agency
to expend additional resources to ensure meaningful judicial review is
relatively minimal.”207 Further, because an agency has already sunk effort
into the action, “requiring the agency to recommence those proceedings will
be less intrusive to the extent” that the agency can pick up where it left
off.208
2. Professor Bressman’s View: Arbitrariness Concerns Imply § 701(a)(2)
Should Be Narrowly Construed
Professor Bressman takes a view sharply opposed to Biber’s resource
allocation theory, arguing that Chaney should be overturned because giving
agencies enforcement discretion fails to prevent arbitrariness, which is a
According to Professor Bressman,
chief concern of the APA.209
arbitrariness is problematic because it is generally the result of agencies
serving narrow interests rather than effectively performing their mission.210
Professor Bressman argues that pro-Chaney scholarly viewpoints rely upon
what she calls the “Accountability Theory of Agency Legitimacy.”211
Within the accountability theory, the president is ultimately responsible for
agency decisionmaking—what Bressman calls the “presidential control
model.”212 Because agencies are thus accountable to the president, who is
accountable to the popular will, the courts need not intervene.213 Professor
Bressman argues that this view is popular because, “[n]ot only does the
presidential control model reconcile agency decisionmaking with the
ultimate form of majority rule, it squares such decisionmaking with the

203. Id. (citing Med. Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 674 (D.C. Cir.
1970)).
204. Id.
205. Id. at 36.
206. Id. at 29.
207. Id.
208. Id. (citing WWHT, Inc. v. FCC, 656 F.2d 807, 816–17 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
209. Bressman, supra note 187, at 1657 (“[F]ounding principles of the administrative
state are dedicated not only to promoting political accountability, but also to preventing
administrative arbitrariness—and reserve a role for judicial review toward that end.”).
210. Id. at 1687–88.
211. Id. at 1675–78.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 1678 (“Courts should have little place micro-managing [enforcement
priorities] when the President is available and suited to that function.”).
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formal structure of our three-branch government by relocating agencies
from the headless fourth branch to the executive branch.”214 Professor
Bressman argues that this is an increasingly popular view tied in with the
concept of the unitary executive, but ultimately incorrect.215
According to Professor Bressman, accountability does not ward against
arbitrariness.216 She notes that “an agency is subject to improper influences
when it refuses to act, just as when it decides to act,”217 and that arbitrary
decisionmaking is primarily the result of improper influence.218
Meanwhile, although the president is accountable to the general populace,
he “exercises control in a manner that is too corrupting and sporadic to
reduce the potential for faction.”219
Professor Bressman then argues that “arbitrary and capricious” review
solves the problem by requiring reason giving and standard setting, thereby
inserting transparency and consistency into the administrative process, and
thus correctly effectuating the APA’s arbitrariness concern.220
Professor Bressman is supported by Professor Robert Percival, who
argues that presidents are not capable of directing the internal affairs of
administrative agencies.221 Thus, under Professor Percival’s theory, even if
presidents are properly accountable to the public, they would not be able to
prevent agencies from engaging in arbitrary decisionmaking.
III. APPLYING § 701(A)(2) TO AGENCY SETTLEMENTS
As stated above, the D.C. Circuit has announced a general rule that
agency settlements are presumptively unreviewable because of § 701(a)(2).
No other circuit court has established binding precedent on a general
application of § 701(a)(2) to agency settlements.222 This section proceeds

214. Id. at 1677; see also Lisa Schulz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness
and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 490 & n.146 (2002).
215. Bressman, supra note 187, at 1676–77 & n.99. The unitary executive theory argues
that the president has authority to direct the actions of administrative agencies because all
executive power is vested in the president. See Robert V. Percival, Who’s in Charge? Does
the President Have Directive Authority over Agency Regulatory Decisions, 79 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2487, 2487 (2011).
216. Bressman, supra note 187, at 1660–61 (arguing that accountability does not protect
against “narrowly interested administrative decisionmaking,” but that “such decisionmaking
nonetheless is ‘arbitrary’ and objectionable”).
217. Id. at 1686.
218. Id. at 1688.
219. Id. at 1690.
220. Id. at 1690–91.
221. Percival, supra note 215, at 2488. For a description of unitary executive theory,
which generally argues that the president controls the entire executive branch, see STEVEN G.
CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM
WASHINGTON TO BUSH (2008).
222. In a nonprecedential opinion, the Third Circuit followed the D.C. Circuit, holding
settlements are presumptively unreviewable. See Mahoney v. U.S. Consumer Prods. Safety
Comm’n, 146 F. App’x 587, 590 (3d Cir. 2005). The Ninth Circuit, however, has ruled
individual settlement decisions reviewable in at least two instances. See United States v.
Carpenter, 526 F.3d 1237, 1241 (9th Cir. 2008); Portland Gen. Elec. Co. v. Bonneville
Power Admin., 501 F.3d 1009, 1013, 1031–32 (9th Cir. 2007).
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in two parts. Part III.A describes the course of the D.C. Circuit’s
§ 701(a)(2) settlement jurisprudence. Part III.B describes the D.C. Circuit’s
separation of powers concern if agency settlements are reviewable.
A. The D.C. Circuit’s Schering Line: Evolving from Simple No-Action
Decisions to Comprehensive “Settlement Rulemaking”
The D.C. Circuit extended Chaney’s presumption of unreviewability to
an agency settlement decision more than twenty years ago in Schering
Corp. v. Heckler.223 In that case, the settlement was little more than a
binding time-limited nonenforcement decision.224 Since then, however, the
D.C. Circuit has extended unreviewability to traditional settlements—
settlements whereby the private actor pays some form of monetary
consideration in return for cessation of an enforcement action or dismissal
of a suit that could have resulted in harsher sanctions like a larger fine.225
Recently, the court held unreviewable a “Settlement Rulemaking”—a
comprehensive plan offering settlements to all regulated entities without
assessing each case’s individual merits.226 The D.C. Circuit has largely
relied upon Chaney’s factor analysis, in particular the “complicated
balancing” factor, rather than Overton Park’s “no law to apply.” This
section traces the evolution of the D.C. Circuit’s settlement decisions.
1. Schering Corp. v. Heckler: Agency Settlement May Be
Akin to a No-Action Decision
In Schering Corp. v. Heckler, the FDA had instituted a seizure against
Tri-Bio, a drug manufacturer, for failure to seek FDA approval for a drug,
Gentaject.227 Tri-Bio sued the FDA, seeking a determination that Gentaject
was not a “new animal drug” and therefore required no approval.228 The
FDA and Tri-Bio then settled the case—the FDA would not bring
enforcement litigation against Gentaject for eighteen months, giving the
FDA time to examine the drug’s status.229 Schering Corporation, the maker
of the drug upon which Gentaject is based, sued the FDA, challenging the
settlement with Tri-Bio.230
The court held the FDA’s settlement decision unreviewable, reasoning
that it was little more than a decision not to prosecute for a set period of
time.231 The court explained that “the settlement agreement merely holds
enforcement in abeyance until the agency can determine whether Gentaject

223. 779 F.2d 683, 685–86 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
224. See id.
225. See Ass’n of Irritated Residents v. EPA, 494 F.3d 1027, 1029–30 (D.C. Cir. 2007);
N.Y. State Dep’t of Law v. FCC, 984 F.2d 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
226. See infra Part III.A.3.
227. Schering Corp., 779 F.2d at 684.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 685.
230. Id. at 684.
231. Id. at 686.
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is a product subject to the Act’s requirements,” which, as a “paradigm case
of enforcement discretion,”232 was unreviewable under Chaney.233
The court also reiterated Chaney’s concern that enforcement decisions
“involve a complex balancing of an agency’s priorities, informed by
judgments ‘peculiarly within its expertise.’”234 But it did not hold that all
settlements should be unreviewable; rather, that this particular settlement
decision was an unreviewable exercise of enforcement discretion.235
2. New York State Department of Law v. FCC: Applying the Chaney
Factor Analysis to Settlements
The D.C. Circuit next addressed agency settlement in New York State
Department of Law v. FCC.236 In this case, the court explicitly rejected the
notion that settlements are exactly like no-action decisions,237 but
nonetheless held they are presumptively unreviewable under Chaney’s
resource allocation factor.
The FCC has certain rules and policies about the fee rates that a
telephone company may charge an affiliate to prevent regulated affiliates
from overcharging customers by passing fees through nonregulated
affiliates.238 After an investigation, the FCC concluded that certain
affiliates of a telephone company “appear[ed] to have violated [the FCC’s]
affiliate transaction rules and policies” and that there was a valid basis for
enforcement proceedings.239
The FCC issued an order to show cause240 why the telephone affiliates
should not be subject to various sanctions, including adjusting certain
accounting statements and paying a forfeiture of almost $1.5 million.241
The telephone affiliates contested the enforcement proceeding;
subsequently, the FCC entered into a consent decree.242 The consent decree
required the telephone affiliates to adhere to all the terms of the order to

232. Id.
233. Id. at 684.
234. Id. at 685 (quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985)).
235. Id. at 686 (“While we do not hold that any agency settlement with a potential
regulatee, whatever its terms, is unreviewable under Chaney, we think it clear that in this
case the agreement merely embodies a legitimate exercise of enforcement discretion.”).
236. 984 F.2d 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
237. Id. at 1214 (“This case differs from Chaney in that it involves a decision to settle an
enforcement action once begun, not a decision whether to initiate the action in the first
place.”).
238. Id. at 1210–11.
239. Id. at 1212 (alteration in original) (quoting Order To Show Cause, In re N.Y. Tel.
Co. & New Eng. Tel. & Tel. Co., 5 FCC Rcd. 866, 869 (1990)).
240. Id. at 1211. The order to show cause started the enforcement proceeding, notified
the regulated entity of sanctions, and gave it thirty days to respond before the sanctions
would take effect. Order To Show Cause, supra note 239, at 866.
241. N.Y. State Dep’t of Law, 984 F.2d at 1211–12.
242. Id. at 1212. The consent decree was entered by the FCC itself, not an Article III
court.
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show cause except that they were to pay the $1.5 million as a voluntary
contribution to the U.S. Treasury rather than as a forfeiture.243
The New York State Department of Law and a private party challenged
the consent decree because they were disappointed with its terms.244 They
argued that the FCC had underestimated the extent of the overcharging, and
that the settlement was not consistent with the FCC’s statutory enforcement
duties and further violated the agency’s ex parte communications rules and
the APA’s notice and comment requirements.245
The D.C. Circuit held the FCC’s decision to enter into the consent decree
was entitled to the presumption of unreviewability and that the parties
challenging the decree failed to overcome the presumption.246 The court
noted that this case was different than a no-action decision because it did
not involve the decision whether to initiate an action, but rather whether to
end one.247 Nonetheless, the court held that settlements should be
unreviewable under Chaney. The court noted that the FCC is best
positioned to weigh the benefits and costs of pursuing an adjudication and
the likelihood of success.248 Rejecting the challenger’s argument that the
agency erred by only pursuing one theory of liability, the court observed
that if it required agencies to always demand all legal remedies available,
that would create an “all-or-nothing approach” that “would discourage
many responsible and fruitful enforcement actions.”249
The court was careful to distinguish another case, MCI
Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, where it had held reviewable an FCC
decision to end an enforcement action because “it was based on a premise
that ‘everyone involved knew, and . . . the FCC had conceded at argument it
knew’ to be faulty”250—an instance of granting reviewability on a “pure”
abuse of discretion theory.251 The court, however, concluded that MCI was
distinguishable because there, the FCC had completed an adjudication on
the merits, whereas in this case, the enforcement action was terminated
before any legal issues could be resolved.252 This reasoning would appear
to create the counterintuitive result—from the perspective of a third party—
that if an agency’s enforcement division settled a case before it had reached
an outcome within agency adjudication, it would be unreviewable, but if the
agency enforcement division prevailed during agency adjudication and then
243. Id.
244. Id. Because the settlement terms were very similar to the FCC’s original demands,
one imagines that, had the enforcement action been completed, they would have challenged
that instead.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 1215 (“We conclude, therefore, that the FCC’s decision to enter into the
Consent Decree with the [telephone affiliates] is non-reviewable under Chaney.”).
247. Id. at 1214.
248. Id. at 1213.
249. Id. at 1216.
250. Id. at 1214 (citing MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. FCC, 917 F.2d 30, 41 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).
251. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
252. N.Y. State Dep’t of Law, 984 F.2d at 1214. The New York State Department of Law
court noted that in MCI Telecommunications Corp., the situation was so different that neither
the court nor the agency mentioned Chaney. See id.
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settled after being challenged in an Article III court, the settlement would
be reviewable even on a pure abuse of discretion theory.
3. Ass’n of Irritated Residents v. EPA: Using Settlements
To Simulate a Rulemaking
Ass’n of Irritated Residents v. EPA is the most recent D.C. Circuit case
upholding the presumption of unreviewability for agency settlement.253 In
this case, the D.C. Circuit held that a regulatory scheme to offer settlements
to any regulated entity potentially affected by a recent regulation was
unreviewable, even though, by creating a general scheme, the agency was
not exercising enforcement discretion on a case-by-case basis.
Under the Clean Air Act and other statutes, the EPA regulates certain air
pollutants.254 Animal feeding operations (AFOs), which are facilities that
raise animals for eggs, dairy, and meat, create these pollutants, but the EPA
lacked the means to measure their output.255 Roughly speaking, AFOs emit
the regulated pollutants in proportion to their size.256 Rather than initiate
enforcement actions with an insufficient emissions-measuring
methodology, the EPA offered every AFO a standardized “Consent
Agreement,” which is a settlement.257 The Consent Agreement required the
AFO to pay a civil penalty for potential violations based on the AFO’s size
and to help fund a study to develop an emissions-estimating
methodology.258 In return, the EPA agreed not to pursue enforcement
actions for a set period of time.259
Community and environmental groups challenged the settlement
scheme.260 They argued that the EPA exceeded its statutory authority and
that the settlements were actually rules disguised as enforcement actions.261
Part of the challengers’ concern was probably the relatively generous offer
of the settlement scheme. As Judge Judith Rogers noted in her dissent,
AFOs that agreed to the settlement were able to buy at least two years of
exemption from enforcement for at most $100,000, whereas, in the absence
of the settlement scheme, “‘potential civil penalties could run up to $32,500
per day per violation.’”262
The court reasoned that this particular settlement was entitled to the
presumption of unreviewability because of the settlement rule in Schering
Corp.,263 and because of Chaney’s “complicated balancing” factor. It noted
that the EPA made a determination that the standardized settlement scheme

253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

Ass’n of Irritated Residents v. EPA, 494 F.3d 1027, 1031 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1028.
Id.
Id. at 1029.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1030.
Id.
Id. at 1038 n.1 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
Id. at 1031 (majority opinion).
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would “lead to quicker industry-wide compliance,” and that “judgments—
arising from considerations of resource allocation, agency priorities, and
costs of alternatives—are well within the agency’s expertise and
discretion.”264
The court held that, because the relevant statutes were framed in
permissive rather than mandatory terms, the agency had discretion whether
to enforce.265 The court noted that, under the relevant statutes, the
president “may” bring an enforcement action to asses a penalty.266 The
court did note that the statutes provide limitations on the dollar amounts for
each type of violation, but held that this was insufficient to infer that the
agency’s enforcement discretion was restricted.267
Judge Rogers, in dissent, argued that this enforcement action was not
committed to agency discretion. By assessing a monetary fine, she argued,
the EPA had exercised its coercive power, and therefore, under Chaney, the
action should not be entitled to a presumption of unreviewability.268 Judge
Rogers also argued that, because the settlements were offered generally,
they did not constitute the form of case-by-case enforcement discretion
contemplated in Chaney.269
In addition to the § 701(a)(2) exemption, the D.C. Circuit has also raised
the argument, discussed below, that holding agency settlements reviewable
might be a separation of powers problem.
B. The D.C. Circuit’s Separation of Powers Argument
In one case, Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission,270 the D.C. Circuit also stated that settlement decisions should
be presumptively unreviewable because to hold otherwise would create a
separation of powers problem.271 According to the Baltimore Gas court,
one reason for the Chaney presumption was that “[w]hen the judiciary
orders an executive agency to enforce the law it risks arrogating to itself a
power that the Constitution commits to the executive branch.”272 The court
found that under the Take Care Clause of the Constitution,273 the powers
both “to decline to enforce a law [and] to enforce a law in a particular way”

264. Id. at 1031–32.
265. Id. at 1032.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 1041 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
269. Id.
270. 252 F.3d 456, 459–60 (D.C. Cir. 2001). The D.C. Circuit does not raise separation
of powers in any other agency settlement reviewability case.
271. Id. at 459 (“Indeed, Chaney’s recognition that the courts must not require agencies to
initiate enforcement actions may well be a requirement of the separation of powers
commanded by our Constitution.”).
272. See id.
273. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (“[The President] shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed . . . .”).

1400

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

are committed to the executive branch.274 Under the court’s theory,
settlement is a decision to “enforce a law in a particular way.”
The court then noted, in contrast, that if Congress wished to restrict
executive agency enforcement discretion, it could do so because, “[u]nlike a
judicial command to initiate an enforcement action, Congress’s authority to
impose discretion-curtailing limitations is fully consistent with the
executive’s power to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. Such
restrictions are simply an instance of lawmaking, a power committed to
Congress by the Constitution.”275
IV. BALANCING ALL FOUR CHANEY FACTORS: SETTLEMENTS
ARE NOT PRESUMPTIVELY UNREVIEWABLE
Settlements should not be entitled to a presumption of unreviewability
under § 701(a)(2). Under “no law to apply,” settlements are not
distinguishable from no-action decisions. However, analyzing no-action
decisions under “no law to apply” is problematic, and settlements share
those problems. Under Chaney’s factor analysis, the “complicated
balancing” resource allocation factor cuts in favor of unreviewability, but
considerably less strongly than for no-action decisions. Meanwhile, the
other three factors each indicate settlements should be reviewable.
This section proceeds in three parts. Part IV.A applies “no law to apply”
to settlement decisions. Part IV.B applies Chaney’s factor analysis. Part
IV.C addresses the separation of powers argument.
A. “No Law To Apply” Is an Unworkable Test for
Enforcement Decisions, Including Settlements
From a “no law to apply” perspective, settlements are not distinguishable
from no-action decisions. Chaney announced that there is “no law to
apply” when there is “no meaningful standard against which to judge the
agency’s exercise of discretion.”276 Chaney distinguished its enforcement
no-action decision from Overton Park’s highway fund allocation because
the no-action decision was unconstrained by statute, whereas the fund
allocation required the agency to perform specific statutory duties in
conjunction with the decision.277 Thus, the highway fund allocation
decision was “constrained by statute,” and the no-action decision was
not.278 Unless otherwise constrained by statute, then, settlements are akin
to no-action decisions under the reasoning in Chaney.
However, as Professor Levin argues, the factor analysis, rather than “no
law to apply,” was the driving force behind the Chaney decision.279

274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.

Balt. Gas, 252 F.3d at 459 (emphasis added).
Id.
See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 135–36 and accompanying text.
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Settlements and no-action decisions are both enforcement decisions,280 and
therefore are far more closely related to each other than to highway funding
decisions. If the factor analysis is the appropriate test for no-action
decisions, it should apply for settlements as well.
Professor Levin’s argument that “no law to apply” was not the driving
force behind Chaney is compelling. There are at least three reasons
indicating that “no law to apply” was insufficient to support the ruling.
First, the Chaney Court did not rest on its “no law to apply” argument,
but rather continued to its factor analysis.
Second, “no law to apply” cannot answer the “pure” abuse of discretion
problem. No-action decisions are susceptible to “pure” abuse of discretion
theories—for example, that an agency’s no-action decision might rest on an
unjustifiable factual assumption.281 Settlements suffer the same problem.
If courts do not use “pure” abuse of discretion when analyzing
reviewability, they risk declaring agency actions “committed to agency
discretion by law,” even though those actions have judicially manageable
standards for rejection under “abuse of discretion.”282 If, however, they do
use pure abuse of discretion, they eviscerate § 701(a)(2) because there is
always some applicable standard.283
Finally, as Justice Scalia argued, § 701(a)(2) should not be limited to
instances where agency discretion is statutorily constrained because the text
of the subsection expresses a more expansive notion of unreviewability.284
Note that this does not mean that the world of § 701(a)(2) exceptions is a
strict superset of the statutory constraint test, but rather that it merely covers
a broader range of possible agency action.
These three arguments together support the position that “no law to
apply” is not alone sufficient to generate an inference of unreviewability in
all cases. This viewpoint is entirely consistent with Overton Park, where
the Court, despite the language it chose,285 merely held that because there
was “law to apply,” there was reviewability, but did not hold that the
inverse was true as well.286 This explains why the Chaney court used a
different test altogether—the factor analysis—whose application is
discussed below.

280. See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
281. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 112–14 and accompanying text.
283. See supra note 113.
284. See supra note 172.
285. See supra note 112 and accompanying text. The Court said that § 701(a)(2) only
applies when there is “no law to apply,” but it held that § 701(a)(2) does not apply when
there is “law to apply.” See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
286. See supra note 103 and accompanying text. Webster v. Doe, because it did hold that
lack of law to apply implied there was no reviewability, provides a counterpoint. But,
because it was decided after Chaney, see supra note 168, it may not necessarily be relevant
in the enforcement decision context.
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B. Settlements Are Not No-Action Decisions and They Are Reviewable
Under Chaney’s Four-Factor Analysis
Under a correct reading of Chaney, settlements are reviewable. First, as
explained below, settlements are meaningfully different than no-action
decisions. Second, under the four-factor analysis, the “complicated
balancing” resource allocation factor cuts in favor of unreviewability, but
considerably less strongly than for no-action decisions. Meanwhile, the
other three factors each indicate settlements should be reviewable.
Settlements bear a superficial resemblance to no-action decisions
because, from the agency’s perspective, they take the form of a promise not
to enforce a rule or regulation.287 However, as observed by the D.C.
Circuit, settlements are different than no-action decisions because no-action
decisions are decisions whether to initiate actions, whereas settlements are
decisions to conclude them.288 For this reason, reviewability of settlements
and no-action decisions has very different implications in terms of an
agency’s discretion to manage its resources—discussed in detail below.
This no-action definition is consistent with Chaney, which was a denial of a
petition by a third party to launch an enforcement action, and with the D.C.
Circuit’s decisions in New York State Department of Law and Ass’n of
Irritated Residents, which argue settlements are unreviewable not because
they are no-action decisions, but rather based on Chaney’s factor
analysis.289 That being said, a careful examination of Chaney’s factor
analysis reveals that settlements should not be presumptively unreviewable.
“Complicated balancing” presents the strongest argument in favor of
holding settlements unreviewable. Much of the “complicated balancing”
reasoning used in Chaney applies to settlements as well. If settlements are
reviewable, agencies might be forced to pursue or abandon weak claims,
without the ability to salvage the work they have done by seeking a partial
recovery.290 Likewise, agencies might have less flexibility to construct the
plan that they think best meets their policy objectives; Ass’n of Irritated
Residents, for example, can be viewed as a creative solution by the EPA to
figure out how to measure gas pollutants produced by farm animals.291
The complicated balancing justifications for settlements are, however,
considerably weaker than for no-action decisions. Courts commonly use
the resource allocation factor to protect agencies when they must make
large numbers of informal decisions.292 If no-action decisions were
reviewable, it could potentially cripple agencies by forcing them to make
costly examination of an enormous number of complaints.293 Settlement
reviewability, however, does not suffer the same problem. Rather than
287. See supra Parts I.C.1, III.A.I.
288. See supra note 247 and accompanying text.
289. See supra Part IV.A.
290. See supra note 140 and accompanying text (discussing management of enforcement
priorities).
291. See supra Part III.A.3.
292. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
293. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
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exposing the agency to costly examinations of new complaints, settlement
reviewability merely forces agencies to expend more resources on
preexisting investigations, and even then only if they choose to settle, rather
than abandon the investigation outright.294
Admittedly, Ngure v. Ashcroft, where the Eleventh Circuit held that the
BIA’s decision to use a single immigration judge rather than a three-judge
panel was unreviewable, cuts against this argument.295 But that case is
different; the BIA oversees over 28,000 appeals and motions filed
annually,296 so holding the decision reviewable could have potentially
tripled an enormous cost. Further, all the other circuit courts to have
considered the issue in Ngure held that it was reviewable, reinforcing the
“new action” theory.297
Arbitrariness is also a concern that weighs against resource allocation
justifications for unreviewability. As Professor Bressman argues, one of
the APA’s principle concerns was arbitrariness.298 Even if administrative
agencies are meaningfully accountable to elected officials—a debatable
proposition299—that kind of accountability still does not ward against
arbitrariness.300 Professor Bressman was concerned with unreviewability
of no-action decisions, but the same concerns apply to settlements as well.
Arbitrariness concerns arguably motivated Judge Rakoff’s skepticism over
the “troubling” inconsistencies in SEC’s Citigroup and Goldman Sachs
consent decrees,301 and possibly Judge Rogers’s dissent in Ass’n of Irritated
Residents, where the EPA was offering settlements for considerably lower
dollar amounts than the potential civil penalties imposable under the
statute.302 For these reasons, “complicated balancing” is an insufficient
justification to hold settlements unreviewable.
Settlements, unlike no-action decisions, have “focus for judicial review”
because the agency must have examined the settlement decision. Lower
courts routinely hold agency actions have “focus for judicial review”
whenever, either by statute or by the circumstances under which the action
occurred, the agency was compelled to contemplate its decision.303
Settlements necessarily occur after an agency has performed an
investigation of alleged misconduct. Much like the FCC’s consideration of
the prior grant of certification in Transportation Intelligence, Inc.,304 the
pre-settlement investigation serves as a focus point for judicial review.
Settlements also generally have coercive power because they exert a
“direct influence” over the regulated entity. Settlements occur when the
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.

See supra notes 207–08 and accompanying text.
See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
See supra note 145.
See supra note 146.
See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 215, 221 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 215–19 and accompanying text.
See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
See supra note 262 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 149–53 and accompanying text.
See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
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regulated entity furnishes consideration.305 Such consideration is a “direct
influence” from the action of settlement.
Finally, under the prosecutorial discretion analogy, the fourth Chaney
factor, settlements should be reviewable. Plea bargains are negotiated
agreements between the prosecutor and the defendants whereby the
defendant furnishes consideration in the form of a guilty plea in exchange
for a lesser charge or other concession from the prosecutor,306 making them
the appropriate analog for settlements.307 Unlike prosecutors’ decisions not
to indict, plea bargains are subject to judicial review, implying that
settlements should also be subject to review.308
Settlements, therefore, should not be presumptively unreviewable under
§ 701(a)(2). Settlements do not severely restrict agencies’ “complicated
balancing” considerations, and those considerations must be balanced
against meaningful arbitrariness concerns. Meanwhile, the other three
Chaney factors each indicate that settlements should be reviewable.
C. Separation of Powers Concerns Are Unwarranted
The Baltimore Gas court’s separation of powers argument309 suffers
several problems. First, while it is true that prosecutorial decisions on who
and how to charge are within the “core functions” of the executive branch,
and therefore awarded deference,310 that deference does not extend to plea
bargain decisions.311 If judicial review of plea bargains does not violate the
separation of powers, then neither should review of agency settlements.
Second, the Baltimore Gas court concedes that Congress could “impose
discretion-curtailing limitations” on administrative agency enforcement
decisions.312 By imposing a comprehensive scheme of judicial review on
agency action—including the § 701(a)(2) exemption—Congress has already
spoken to the issue. If settlement decisions are not included in the
§ 701(a)(2) exemption then Congress has imposed the discretion-curtailing
limitation, and, therefore, there is no separation of powers concern. This
explains why, when Justice Scalia invokes the “political question” doctrine
in Webster v. Doe, he does so to determine the proper construction of
§ 701(a)(2),313 rather than to attack the basic framework of judicial review
of agency action. Therefore, separation of powers is not a bar to agency
settlement reviewability.

305. See supra Part III.A.2–3 (discussing New York State Department of Law and Ass’n
of Irritated Residents, which both involved monetary settlements).
306. See supra note 85.
307. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
308. See supra notes 86–87 and accompanying text.
309. See supra Part III.B.
310. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
311. See supra notes 86–91, and accompanying text.
312. See supra note 275 and accompanying text.
313. See supra notes 173–75 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
Administrative agency settlements have recently come under increased
judicial scrutiny. While agency actions are presumptively reviewable under
the APA, the Supreme Court held in Heckler v. Chaney that agency noaction decisions are presumptively unreviewable because they are
“committed to agency discretion by law” under APA section 701(a)(2).
Settlements are a “blind spot” within the APA, and the Supreme Court has
not ruled on their general reviewability. The D.C. Circuit has ruled that
they are presumptively unreviewable, but no other circuit has established
binding precedent on the issue. However, based on the criteria set forth in
Chaney, settlements should be reviewable. This viewpoint is consistent
with the APA’s general concern of preventing arbitrary decisionmaking by
imposing judicial review on agency actions.

